Interdisciplinary integration has fundamental limitations. This is not sufficiently realized in science and in philosophy. Concerning scientific theories there are many examples of pseudo-integration which should be unmasked by elementary philosophical analysis. For example, allegedly over-arching theories of stress which are meant to unite biology and psychology, upon analysis, turn out to represent terminological rather than substantive unity. They should be replaced by more specific, local theories. Theories of animal orientation, likewise, have been formulated in unduly general terms. A natural (...) history approach is more suitable for the study of animal orientation. The tendency to formulate overgeneral theories is also present in evolutionary biology. Philosophy of biology can only deal with these matters if it takes a normative turn. Undue emphasis on interdisciplinary integration is a modern variant of the old unity of science ideal. The replacement of the ideal by a better one is an important challenge for the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Grime (1979) in a recently developed theory distinguished three basic plant strategies: stress tolerance,ruderality and competition. He relates them to environments characterized in terms of stress and disturbance. Classifications of strategies and environments both are ultimately defined in terms of production. This tends to make the theory tautological. If the theory is to make sense, environments had better be defined in independent terms.

Does ethics have adequate general theories? Our analysis shows that this question does not have a straightforward answer since the key terms are ambiguous. So we should not concentrate on the answer but on the question itself. “Ethics” stands for many things, but we let that pass. “Adequate” may refer to varied arrays of methodological principles which are seldom fully articulated in ethics. “General” is a notion with at least three meanings. Different kinds of generality may be at cross-purposes, so (...) we must not expect theories to be general in sundry senses. “Theory,” for that matter, is itself ambiguous. Some thinkers say that ethics cannot have theories, while others deny it. We doubt whether opposing parties are talking about the same things.No wonder, then, that controversies in ethics are long-lasting and unproductive. We hope that the methodology we have presented will alleviate some of them. The examples we chose show that this is feasible. Views such as Hare's and Jonsen and Toulmin's which are seemingly wide apart, show convergence if we put them in a methodological perspective.Our analysis also suggests that many alleged differences between science and ethics could fade away if methodology is brought to bear on them. Specifically, the idea that ethics compares poorly with science in view of limited generality, or poor means of justification, is unfounded. Those who defend this view over-rate the powers of science. (shrink)

Philosophical theories about reduction and integration in science are at variance with what is happenign in science. A realistic approach to science show that possibilities for reduction and integration are limited. The classical ideal of a unified science has since long been rejected in philosophy. But the current emphasis on interdisciplinary integration in philosophy and in science shows that it survives in a different guise. It is necessary to redress the balance, specifically in biology. Methodological analysis shows that many of (...) the grand interdisciplinary theories involving biology actually represent pseudo-integration covered up by inappropriate, overgeneral concepts. Integrationism is not bad, but it must be kept within reasonable bounds. If the present analysis is appropriate, there will have to be fundamental changes in research strategy both in science and in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

One of the major criticisms of optimal foraging theory (OFT) is that it is not testable. In discussions of this criticism opposing parties have confused methodological concepts and used meaningless biological concepts. In this paper we discuss such misunderstandings and show that OFr has an empirically testable, and even well-confirmed, general core theory. One of our main conclusions is that specific model testing should not be aimed at proving optimality, but rather at identifying the context in which certain types of (...) behaviour are optimal. To do this, it is necessary to be aware of the assumptions made in testing a model. The assumptions that are explicitly stated in the literature up to now do not completely cover the actual assumptions made in testing OFT models in practice. We present a more comprehensive set of assumptions. Although all the assumptions play a role in testing models, they are not of equal status. Crucial assumptions concern constraints and the relation between fitness and currency. Therefore, it is essential to make such assumptions testable in practice. We show that a more explicit relationship between OFT modelling and evolutionary theory can help with this. Specifically, phylogeny reconstruction and population dynamic modelling can and should be used to formulate assumptions concerning constraints and currencies. (shrink)

Science is not value-free and ethics is not fact-free. Science and ethics should be similar, but they are not. The author indicates how research in ethics is to change in the face of this. Ethicists should accommodate empirical work in their programs and they should take heed of methodologies developed in science and philosophy of science. They should abandon the search for a single overarching theory of morality. Controversies in ethics are often spurious for lack of articulate methodological key concepts. (...) For example, disagreements over the value of general theories are misguided since disputants implicitly use different notions of generality and different notions of theory. An appropriate methodology does not suffice for the resolution of controversies but it is indispensable for consensus. The book argues these theses in a general way and applies them to the subject of egoism and altruism in ethics. Further case studies concern the environment and psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

The impact of philosophy of science on biology is slight. Evolutionary biology, however, is nowadays an exception. The status of the neo-Darwinian (synthetic) theory of evolution is seriously challenged from a methodological perspective. However, the methodology used in the relevant discussions is plainly defective. A correct application of methodology to evolutionary theory leads to the following conclusions. (a) The theory of natural selection (the core of neo-Darwinism) is unfalsifiable in a strict sense of the term. This, however, does not militate (...) against the theory, because no scientific theory whatever is testable in this way. Under a more liberal testability criterion, the theory is surely testable. None the less, certain (not all) research programs may tend to make the theory untestable in practice. (b) It has often been argued that the tautologous character of the principle of natural selection, allegedly the focus of evolutionary theory, makes the theory untestable through circular reasoning. Actually, the principle is only a tautology if fitness is wrongly defined in terms of actual survival. But even then circular reasoning need not ensue. (c) Evolutionary principles do not permit, without additional information, the derivation of statements about evolutionary events concerning particular species or populations. If this were a reason to criticize the theory (as has been argued in the literature), any other scientific theory would be inadequate by the same token. (shrink)

Apparently factual disagreement on the level(s) at which selection operates often results from different interpretations of the term selection. Attempts to resolve terminological problems must come to grips with a dilemma: a narrow interpretation of selection may lead to a restricted view on evolution; a broader, less precise, definition may wrongly suggest that selection is the centre of a unified, integrated theory of evolution. Different concepts of selection, therefore, should carefully be kept apart.

Rosenberg has rightly argued that fitness is supervenient. But he has wrongly assumed that this makes The fittest survive nontautologous. Supervenience makes strict reduction impossible. It sheds light on disputes concerning the testability of evolutionary theory.

Many authors have argued that the core of evolutionary biology as represented by the catchphrase 'The fittest survive' is tautological. Concerning the fitness concept of population genetics it is easy to rebut this charge by a proper explication of the term 'survival'. In biology and in the philosophy of biology, various fitness concepts over and above that of population genetics have been elaborated. These concepts, which are called 'supervenient' by some philosophers, have a limited usefulness. On some interpretations they do (...) lead to unacceptable tautologies and circular reasoning. The so-called propensity concept of fitness is problematic in this respect. If interpreted in a proper way, supervenient concepts appear not to allow the formulation of highly general explanations and theories; at best they reveal common patterns among diverse non-general explanations and theories. Philosophers cherishing supervenient fitness concepts are apparently motivated by a mistaken search for general theory. The fitness concept of population genetics may play a role in relatively general theories and explanations. Supervenient concepts cannot play such a role. They should rather help us recognize the value of natural history in biology. (shrink)

Animal liberation ethics and environmental ethics have recently come of age. Concerning concrete moral rules considered by researchers in these areas there is much consensus. Highly general theories formulated to justify the rules are more problematic. However, the search for such theories may well be misguided.